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JURISDICTION AND THE INDIAN CREDIT PROBLEM:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOLUTION
by John 0. Mudd
INTRODUCTION
Two recent court decisions involving Montana Indians have high-
lighted questions of Indian jurisdiction which will be faced by the
courts for some time to come. In Kennerly v. District Court,, the United
State Supreme Court held that state courts do not have jurisdiction
to hear a claim brought by a non-Indian against an Indian for money
owing on a contract made on a reservation. Shortly afterward, the
Montana Court in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernosc2 applied the Ken-
nerly ruling to deny state jurisdiction over a mortgage foreclosure
involving Indian land and brought by the Tribe against one of its
members.
The aftermath of the Kennerly decision is still being felt in the
Montana courts as other areas of state jurisdiction over Indians con-
tinue to be tested.3 This paper will discuss only one fact of Indian
affairs which has been affected: Indian credit. 4 An attempt will first
be made to show that Indian credit has been affected by the jurisdiction-
al problems flowing from the recent decisions. The second portion
will deal with possible solutions and how they stand up against develop-
ing Indian policy.
THE PROBLEM
It was settled by the Kennerly and Crow Tribe decisions that state
courts do not have jurisdiction over actions involving Indians where
the contract was made on a reservation; nor where an Indian sues an
Indian on a mortgage of Indian land.5 If jurisdiction can be found at
all, it must be in either tribal or federal court.
It has been established by the federal courts that a suit cannot be
brought in federal court merely because one of the parties is an Indian.6
1Kennerly v. District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana, 400 U.S. 423
(1971).
2The Crow Tribe of Indians v. Deernose. ........ Mont ......... , 487 P.2d 1133 (1971).
3Only recently the Montana Supreme Court held that state courts are without jurisdic-
tion in Indian juvenile matters. In re Blackwolf, 29 St.Rep. 128 . Mont .........
....---. P.2d ........ , (February 23, 1972). This is an area with a long history of state
court involvement.
'Since so many Indian matters were formerly handled in state courts, few remain un-
touched by these decisions. Rather than survey the entire jurisdictional field, it would
seem better here to concentrate attention on the problems created in Indian credit
in the hope that possible solutions discovered there may have application to other areas.
'These two decisions are discussed in greater detail infra.
'Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1959); Rice v. Sioux City
Memorial Park Cemetery, 102 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ia. 1952); Snyder v. Faucher, 7
F. Supp. 597 (W.D. N.Y. 1932); Deer v. St. Lawrence River Power Co., 32 F.2d
550 (2d Cir. 1929).
Martinez, supra note 6.
1
Mudd: Jurisdiction and the Indian Credit Problem
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1972
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe7 the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
emphasized that, "an Indian, because he is an Indian, has no greater
right to sue in a Federal Court than any other litigant."8 In the absence
of a specific Congressional grant of federal jurisdiction, Indians who
seek to enter federal court to litigate civil matters must do so under the
common forms of diversity of citizenship" and federal question10 pro-
visions, keeping in mind that the Martinez language also implies that
diversity cannot be found merely because one party is an Indian."
While Congress has specifically conferred federal jurisdiction in
Indian criminal matters,12 relatively few areas of civil litigation have
received a similar treatment. District courts have original jurisdiction
to hear all civil actions brought by recognized tribes, but the subject
matter of the dispute must arise "under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."13 Original jurisdiction is also given dis-
trict courts to hear the claims of individual Indians to allege they are
entitled to receive allotments of Indian lands.14 While these two sec-
tions are relatively clear, other provisions for federal jurisdiction are
much less easily interpreted. For example, 25 USC § 349 provides in
part:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been
conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee, as provided in section 348
of this title, then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of
and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they may reside. . . Provided further, That
until the issuance of a fee-simple patent all allottees to whom trust
patents shall be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States...
The statute has been used to find state jurisdiction in criminal proceed-
ings1 5 but at least two questions can be raised regarding the "exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States:" (1) How is the language reconciled
with cases holding that an Indian as an Indian has no greater right
to a hearing in federal court than any other litigant?16 (2) Does "ex-
clusive" federal jurisdiction mean exclusive of tribal jurisdiction? If
8Id. at 734.
'28 U.S.C. § 1331.
"28 U.S.O. § 1332.
"See also Deer, supra note 6 at 551.
"See 18 U.S.C. §§1152, 1153, 3242. Note also the emphasis on criminal matters found
in Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indians, S. 961-68 & S.J. Res. 40,
Before the Subcom. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate. Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
"28 U.S.C. § 1362.
1428 U.S.C. § 1353.
"State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926); Bonds v. Sherburn Mercantile,
169 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1948).
"Two factors may be considered in resolving the apparent contradiction: (1) in the
decisions holding that an Indian as an Indian is not entitled to federal jurisdiction,
none of the courts were explicitly considering § 349; (2) while the courts in those
cases did not make the distinction between Indians and Indian allottees, the distinc-
tion may be decisive in determining the jurisdictional effects of § 349 since it applies
to '' allottees to whom trust patents shall be issued.''
[Vol. 33
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so, how is that reconciled with cases which speak of non-interference
in tribal affairs17 and federal deference to tribal courts in certain
circumstances ?1
Even when legitimate grounds for federal jurisdiction are found,
however, the jurisdictional questions are not ended. For example, even
if federal jurisdiction may be invoked on the grounds of diversity of
citizenship or because a federal question is presented, there remains
the barrier of the required $10,000 in controversy. While many land
and business loans would meet the requirement, it would certainly
prevent federal courts from hearing a good deal of other Indian credit
cases.
Another recent and more important factor has added further diffi-
culty in finding federal jurisdiction in Indian civil matters. In Williams
v. Lee'9 the United States Supreme Court held that state courts do not
have jurisdiction in certain matters involving Indians when state juris-
diction would interfere with tribal affairs.20 The United States Court
of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has held that the logical extention of the
Williams principle requires that the federal court also refuse to exercise
its jurisdiction where that jurisdiction would interfere with internal
tribal affairs. In Littell v. Nakai, the federal court held it had no juris-
diction to hear a request by the non-Indian tribal attorney for an in-
junction against the tribal council to prohibit its interference with the
attorney's performance of his retainer contract. The significant juris-
dictional feature of the decision was the court's refusal to assume juris-
diction even though it conceded that the facts entitled the plaintiff
to diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1332. In giving its reason the
court noted:
... a strong Congressional policy to vest the Navajo Tribal Govern-
ment with responsibility for their own affairs emerges from the
decision in Williams. Plainly, fruition of the policy depends upon
freedom from outside interference. And federal court jurisdiction
would be equally disruptive of the policy as would state court juris-
diction. 21
Continued application of the Littell principle of federal abstention
where tribal matters are at stake is bound to result in a further decrease
of an already limited scope of federal jurisdiction in Indian civil actions.
In the Crow Tribe situation for example, it might be argued that a
federal court should not accept jurisdiction since both parties were
Indians and the transaction involved Indian land. This would appear
to be a case where non-Indian jurisdiction could "infringe on the right
"Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
"Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 852.
IWilliams, supra note 17.
'This case and other decisions following from it are discussed in the preceeding student
note.
'Little, supra note 18 at 489; see also U.S. ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court,
244 F.Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965).
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of the Indians to govern themselves." 22  What is significant is that
even though the federal court might legitimately assume jurisdiction
as noted by the Montana Court in Crow Tribe, the federal court might
still refuse to assume jurisdiction under the principle of non-interference.
Such abstention makes federal jurisdiction in Indian civil matters sub-
ject to an added restriction and thus even more questionable.
In response to further limitations of state and federal jurisdiction,
the jurisdiction of tribal courts is expanding.24 A non-Indian's rights
under a contract made with an Indian on a reservation must be enforced
in tribal court;2"5 a non-Indian must use the tribal court to protect
his rights under an employment contract with an Indian ;26 tribal court
may require a non-Indian to show cause why he should not be enjoined
from entering reservation land to get to property he has leased from
an Indian :27 Indians must use tribal court in certain divorce
28 and tort 29
actions. The decisions affect both Indians and those non-Indians who
have dealings with Indians.
As state and federal courts withdraw from Indian civil matters there
appears to be a related withdrawal of the non-Indian businessman.
The appended study reflects the affect of the two Montana cases (Ken-
nerly and Crow Tribe) on the reservation, where the Crow Tribe case
arose, and the nearby community.30 It indicates the impact of the cases
2Williams, supra note 17 at 223,
2Crow Tribe, supra note 2 at 1134, 1135.
"For the relation of tribal and state courts in Montana See PARKER, STATE AND TaRIAL
COURTS: THE JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIP, supra.
'Williams, supra note 17.
2Littell, supra note 18.
2 Rollingson, supra note 21.
OWhyte v. District Court of Montezuma County, 40 Colo. 1334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959).
"Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 164 N.W.2d 886 (1969).
80While the study was limited to one Montana reservation, there is evidence that these
decisions have had a much broader impact, calling into question the status of Indian
loans amounting to several million dollars in Montana alone, and significantly greater
amounts in other states where there is a larger Indian population.
In Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D. S. D., 1971), the federal
court took jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. §1343 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 which allow the
court to hear cases involving a deprivation of federally protected rights under color
of state law. In denying state jurisdiction to enforce a lien on cattle taken as security
for a loan and located on Indian land, the court nevertheless assumed jurisdiction of
the bank's counterclaim for the amount of the loan. The overall effect was for the
loan to be enforced anyway, but by the federal rather than the state court. The court
commented at 138, "the result of granting plaintiff an injunction without granting
defendant relief on his counterclaim would be to cut off credit to enrolled Indians
living within the closed portions of the reservation.'' The footnote adds, ''It appears,
however, that such a result could still occur if an enrolled Indian should stay within
the state judicial system in view of the holding of the South Dakota Supreme Court."
After the Crow Tribe decision, Production Credit Associations (P.C.A.) face a
special problem since they are prevented by statute from using federal courts to en-
force their loans. 12 U.S.C. &1138. This leaves tribal courts with the task of enforcing
loans and mortgages in significant amounts. At this writing the Farm Credit Act of
1971 being considered by the House of Representatives would allow P.C.A. 's to use
federal courts in cases "against any person over whom the courts of the state have
no jurisdiction." H.R. 11232, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
[Vol. 33
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 33 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/8
1972] JURISDICTION AND THE INDIAN CREDIT PROBLEM: 311
on the availability of credit legally obtained from non-Indian lenders."'
As a practical matter, non-Indian lenders who face the possibility of
using tribal courts to enforce their contracts can be expected to be
hesitant in extending credit. The same is true with Indian lenders who
in some cases have an equal reluctance to use tribal court. The study
bears out this fact.
When the United States Supreme Court in Williams held that a
non-Indian creditor had to sue his Indian debtor in tribal court, it went
to some length to describe the advanced system of justice developed by
the Navajo Tribe:
. . . Congress and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have assisted in
strengthening the Navajo tribal government and its courts.
The Tribe itself has in recent years greatly improved its legal
system through increased expenditures and better trained per-
sonnel. Today the Navajo Court of Offenses exercise broad criminal
and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indian
defendants.3 2
The result in that case might have been as legally sound, but less for-
tunate had the civil issue been more complex and the tribal court less
developed. While the efforts of the tribes, governmental agencies, and
private foundations to improve the courts have met with varying degrees
of success, the fact remains that in some locations the requirement of
using tribal court is enough to cut off credit to Indians which might
otherwise be available.3
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOLUTION
The discussion to this point indicates that there is a problem in the
area of Indian credit which to some degree has been occasioned by the
withdrawal of state courts from Indian affairs, the difficulty in obtaining
federal jurisdiction in Indian civil matters, and the real possibility of a
federal court's refusal to accept jurisdiction when there is an otherwise
legitimate foundation for it. Since the withdrawal of non-Indian juris-
diction places the burden on tribal courts whose capabilities vary great-
ly, lenders avoid litigation in tribal court by simply not extending credit.
To many interested in Indian affairs, the replacement of non-Indian
jurisdiction with tribal jurisdiction is a welcome step in the direction of
increased tribal self-determination. It may be argued that the resultng
8Emphasis is placed on legal credit, since, as the study indicates, there appears to have
been no decrease in the availability of black market type loans in small amounts. The
decisions appear to have increased that type of activity.
"'Williams, supra note 17 at 222.
MAn example of the type of policy problem faced in making more loans available to
Indians is found in the question of security for the loans. 25 U.S.C. §483a permits the
use of Indian land as security. Yet if the loans are obtained from non-Indian lenders,
as is likely in many cases, the tribe runs the risk of diminishing its land base. The
land base is a fundamental source of tribal power and vital to any long range policy
of self-determination. Here the goal of ready credit has great potential for conflict
with the policy of self-determination. Unless there is a careful weighing of all factors,
what may appear to be a satisfactory solution may eventually create an even greater
problem.
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loss of -credit, which may be temporary, is a price happily paid for the
extended freedom from outside interference. Under this view, then, the
present situation should not be disturbed since it is more a part of the
advancement of tribal self-determination than it is a. problem of Indian
credit. Thus the first possibility for a solution. to the problem of Indian
credit is that one is not needed, that things should remain as they are.
Another view is that the present loss of credit, ,whether created by
the confusion as to where* jurisdiction lies, or by lenders' reluctance to
rely on tribal courts, is an.unfortunate blow to the Indians' efforts in
economic development and should be remedied. What follows are some
of the considerations which should enter into a solution should one hold
the view, not that the present state of affairs is as it should be, but that
some concrete action is needed.
The ultimate goal to which a solution to the Indian credit problem
would be directed is that credit be available to Indians as readily as to
other citizens. It must be. added that a solution is without substance
unless it seeks to correct not only the more abstract, legal jurisdictional
barriers to Indian credit, but the practical barriers to using that juris-
diction as well. That is, a statutory solution which would confer juris-
diction to a particular court would be no solution at all if the particular
court did not have the capacity to render a judgment properly and
see that it was carried out.
Any proposed solution must also take into account a development
i inulan affairs wud-i may "e uroadly characterized asa two-sided
policy. On the federal side, there is increased emphasis on removing
some federal control in favor of increased tribal self-determination and
self-government. As President Nixon has phrased it,
Both as a matter of justice and as a matter of enlightened social
policy, we must begin to act on the basis of what the Indians them-
selves have: long been telling us. 'The time has come to break deci-
sively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in
which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian de-
cisions. 4
On the other side there appears to be a desire by both Indians and
non-Indians to avoid state jurisdiction. In Montana this is evidenced by
the failure of the Montana Legislature to assume Indian jurisdiction
permitted by the 1953 act of Congress, 35 and by the failure of the Indians
to seek state jurisdiction under the 1968 provisions. 6
Any proposal to remedy credit problems will to some extent run
contrary to these developments -and may suffer from practical defects
as well. The deficiencies alone need not prevent consideration of a pro-
8
'Richard M. Nixon, MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ONs AMERIcAN INDIANS, July 8, 1970.
5Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 590. State jurisdiction over the Flathead Reser-
vation was sought under the provisions of this act in 1963: REViSED CODES OF MO1-
TANA, § 83-801 (1947).
-25 U.S.C. § 1322.
[Vol. 33
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posal, since it is probable that any recommendation for an effective solu-
tion in 1972 will suffer from a variety of flaws. A good solution may
merely be the one with the fewest defects.
In questioning whether exclusive jurisdiction to hear Indian credit
matters should go to federal, state or tribal courts, a good case can be
made for the federal courts. Such a move would insure that an effective
legal disposition of credit matters would be available regardless of the
location of the action. And since much of Indian affairs is already in
the hands of the federal government, Indian self-determination would
be less affected by this remedy than by conferring jurisdiction to the
state. It would, however, take from Indian courts some of the juris-
diction they already have, and would tend to delay Indian self-govern-
ment.
Exclusive state jurisdiction in Indian credit matters is least in line
with the policy considerations given above, since it would run contrary
to the apparent desires of the federal government, the tribes and the
state. An example of this type of conferral would be found if Congress
were to specifiy that state courts have jurisdiction in mortgage fore-
closure actions under 25 USC § 483a (the section construed in the Crow
Tribe case). In addition to this being only a partial solution, it is the
type of legislation which creates concern on the part of Indians who
are seeking increased tribal independence that once state jurisdiction is
assumed, the tribe will be prevented from ever regaining it (or taking
it for the first time depending on how one reads the present situation) .87
The solution most in line with the more recent Indian policy is to
have Indian courts themselves handle credit matters involving Indians.
Such a move is in line with Williams and would significantly enhance
the Indians' control of their own affairs. The solution suffers to the
extent that tribal courts are unable to meet the burden of the litigation.88
Any proposal must take into account the fact that tribal courts vary
greatly in procedures, records, law, and the training of judges.8 9 While
a particular tribal court may be quite capable of granting specific
performance in a contract action, it may not be able to handle a com-
plicated mortgage foreclosure.
If considerable funds were available, tribes could speed the develop-
ment of their courts by hiring trained Indian and non-Indian judges as
"'This concern was alluded to in Justice Stewart's dissent in Kennerly, supra note 1
at 513.
38There are presently 85 tribal courts which have to handle matters involving nearly
500,000 Indians and 52 million acres of land. 4 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW NEWSLETTER
202 (1971).
"See generally, the HEARINGS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS or THE AmERICAN INDIAN
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1962), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1963), 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3 (1963), and 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4 (1964). See also, the
discussion of this material in Note, Indian Bill of Bights and the Constitutional
Status of Tribal Government, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1343, 1355-60 (1969).
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well as other court personnel. Even though the merits of improving
tribal courts by such a massive funding program may be many, the
effects of such a program, if adopted, would take time to be felt. Time
would be needed not only to have the court function smoothly, but also
for the lenders to gain confidence in the court sufficient for them to
risk their money on the court's judgment.
While a grant.of exclusive jurisdiction to tribal, state or federal
courts would suffer from a variety of drawbacks, some of the deficien-
cies might be remedied by a grant of concurrent jurisdiction. Such a
move would allow more flexibility. The jurisdiction could, for example,
be given to tribal and federal courts with a presumption in favor of
initial tribal court jurisdiction, but with the possibility of a petition
for removal to federal court when certain conditions were met. The
removal could be granted at the discretion of the federal judge if the
party seeking removal presented evidence sufficient to show that he
could not receive a proper hearing in tribal court.
Such a procedure might be drawn to correspond to the current
provisions for removal of state proceedings to federal court.40 Under
the present removal statutes, a defendant may remove a case to federal
court if his petition to the court verifies adequate grounds for federal
jurisdiction. 41 An effective application of this procedure to tribal courts
would require that both plaintiffs and defendants be allowed to petition
for removal. In addition, grounds for removal would have to be ex-
panded to include a showing of an absense of corrective process in the
tribal court or circumstances which make the process ineffective to pro-
tect the rights of the petitioner. An analogy may be drawn between
this procedure and the present removal of civil actions against a person
who claims he cannot enforce his federally protected rights in state
court. 42 Some discretion would be required by the federal court to
which the petition would be directed, but there are ample examples
where such discretion is already exercised in a variety of situations.43
Concurrent jurisdiction would provide some distinct advantages
over an absolute and exclusive grant to any of the three court systems.
A clear Congressional declaration of concurrent jurisdiction in specified
civil matters would eliminate a great deal of confusion which currently
exists in Indian law. As already mentioned, this confusion itself operates
as an obstacle to Indian credit. Such a system would provide an operat-
028 U.S.C. § 1441 ff.
-28 U.S.C. § 1446.
-28 U.S.C. § 1443.
"Federal courts are already called upon to use discretion in issuing writs of habeas
corpus to Indians convicted in tribal court, 25 U.S.C. § 1303. For some of the factors
involved in issuing the writ see: Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965);
Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1969).
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction federal courts also use discretion in
requiring that certain disputes receive an initial determination by an administrative
agency. See Yathanson v. Y.L.R.B. 344 U.S. 25, 30 (1952).
[Vol. 33
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ing forum to handle disputes, which, during the interim of their develop-
ment, tribal courts are unable to treat. By retaining the presumption
of tribal jurisdiction, the system would allow a review of the capabilities
of the particular tribal court on a case by case basis. Since many tribal
courts at the present time are not able to hear all matters equally well,
and since it is doubtful that they will develop at an equal pace, a
great deal of flexibility is required in any provision regarding their
jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction could provide that flexibility.
The presumption of tribal jurisdiction and the cost to the federal
system would offer a theoretical and practical incentive for placing in-
creased responsibility on the tribal court. Other measures could be
added to insure as much tribal court authority as possible. For example,
an opportunity for direct review of the district court's determination
of tribal court ability to treat a particular question.
A system of concurrent jurisdiction is not without problems, both
theoretical and practical. It might deprive tribal courts of jurisdiction
which is arguably theirs exclusively. From the viewpoint of the federal
courts there are increased practical difficulties. The cost in terms of
facilities and personnel is a major consideration. Considerable attention
would have to be given to the question of what law the federal court
would apply after removal. If the comparison with the present removal
from state court is maintained, the federal courts should apply the law
of the jurisdiction from which the case was removed-Indian law. The
difficulty of a federal court applying tribal law is apparent both from
a legal and a cultural viewpoint. The problems would be even greater
if tribal law on the particular issue were unclear or non-existent.
It should also be noted that when a petitioner under present law
seeks removal to protect his federally guaranteed rights in federal court,
both courts evaluate his rights in the light of a single legal tradition.
The same cannot be said if the federal court is asked to evaluate the
protection afforded a petitioner's rights in the court of a different cul-
tural and legal tradition. Where there is a conflict, which view of
personal rights should prevail, tribal or Anglo-American? This conflict
of laws question must eventually be faced regardless of whether Indian
jurisdiction continues to grow under the present jurisdictional arrange-
ments, or whether an entirely different scheme is adopted. If tribal self-
determination is to be authentic, tribal law cannot consist merely in a
wholesale transposition of the common law tradition to Indian courts.
An understanding of this problem must underlie any long range policy
on both original jurisdiction and any system for review between the two
traditions.44
"Serious policy questions have already surfaced in a similar vein in trying to apply
Title II of the CrvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968. 25 U.S.C. §1301 ff. One federal judge
has commented, ''This opinion is written in an effort to reveal some of the problems
concerning the jurisdiction of federal courts inherent in the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
9
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CONCLUSION
It has been suggested here that a great deal of confusion exists in
Indian civil jurisdiction. While substantial confirmation would require
a far broader and more detailed study, there is evidence that this juris-
dictional problem has had an adverse impact on Indian credit in at least
one area. The credit problem may be viewed merely as a side effect of
expanded Indian self-determination or a situation to be remedied by
Congressional action. If the present state of affairs is unhappy, the
corrective measures do not present an altogether pleasant picture either.
Grants of exclusive jurisdiction to state or federal courts prevent the
tribe from handling its own affairs, and a grant (or a verification) of
tribal court jurisdiction may be ineffective in many areas due to the
present status of the tribal courts. Concurrent tribal-federal jurisdiction
offers effectiveness and flexibility as an interim solution in addition to
providing a forum in which issues involved in a final solution can be
raised. But concurrent jurisdiction would be difficult to administer.
It might seem that every possible solution presents more problems
than it solves. That might be reason enough for not doing anything.
On the other hand, it might produce a necessary awareness of the
extent of the repercussions which are felt when only one area of Indian
affairs is dealt with. This awareness and respect for the problem might
at least rule out a hasty, narrowly-considered or piecemeal solution.
While no solution is easy, any decision made-or the decision to do
nothing-must include at least three elements: (1) a factual determina-
tion of the extent of the present problem in Indian civil jurisdiction;
(2) the practical effectiveness of the court machinery involved in any
solution; (3) a basic long-range policy regarding Indian self-determina-
tion and a careful analysis of how that policy might be affected by any
action taken.
1968 and the extent to which that statute requires this court to depart from long
established principles and policies." Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 27 (D. Ariz.
1968).
[Vol. 33
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